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It is interesting to contemplate the competition policy provisions that might
appear in the United States Constitution if it were written in 1994 rather than
1787. Although the members of the 1787 Constitutional Convention were well
aware of the concept of monopolies, the monopolies they feared most were state-
created. For example, the Boston Tea Party in 1773 was as much a reaction to
the grant of a monopoly on tea trade to the British East India Company as it was
to the imposition of a tax;1 and Thomas Jefferson's initial distaste for the grant
of patents (in the context of awarding a monopoly to inventors) is well known.'
The judicial founding fathers were also well aware of the danger of monopolies.
Such landmark cases as Gibbons v. Ogden3 and Proprietors of the Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge4 concerned monopolies, but again,
state-granted monopolies. One early major national experiment with what we
would now call "competition policy" concerned railroad pricing practices, 5
which were finally dealt with legislatively through direct regulation (the Interstate
Commerce Commission) rather than by the application of legal standards. The
railroads in question were also, in effect, forms of state-granted monopolies
through land grants and other arrangements.
The Sherman Act stands as the first "constitutional" enactment of modern
*The authors are attorneys with O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.
1. See BENJAMIN WOODS LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY 91 (1964) ("opposition to the
tea shipment had quickly divided into two themes: (1) if the tea tax is submitted to, other taxes would
soon follow; (2) if the East India Company succeeded in establishing a monopoly over trade in one
commodity, it would soon monopolize all the foreign commerce of America").
2. When Jefferson became Secretary of State, he found himself responsible for issuing patents
and managed to issue a total of three in his first year. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 38
(1981).
3. 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat 1824).
4. 36 U.S. 420 (11 Pet. 1837).
5. E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
66 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
U.S. competition policy. 6 Yet, much of the concern that led to the passage of
the Sherman Act in 1890, and many of its successors, had at least as much to
do with populist politics and theories of political economy as with pure theories
of market competition. 7
The competition policy of a 1994 United States Constitution might resemble
that found in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic
Community. 8 An author of a 1994 U.S. Constitution, seeking to create a single
integrated market, would likely share the same competition concerns as those
expressed in the Treaty of Rome:
* eliminating and preventing barriers (direct and indirect) to trade within the
area and creating single central government control over the regulation of
foreign trade;9
" controlling excessive concentration of market power;'
* disciplining anticompetitive business practices;" and
* avoiding distortions of the internal market caused by subsidies.' 2
As an increasing number of nations share these competition policy concerns, the
global community is seeing a convergence in all three major areas of competition
policy: merger control, subsidies, and anticompetitive business practices. In ef-
fect, international competition law is being fashioned in the manner that interna-
tional law is often developed-piecemeal. 3 Although the interest in a more formal-
6. "Antitrust laws ... are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1971).
7. For example, the idea that "big is bad." See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270 (1966).
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. On November 8, 1993, the European Community officially became
known as the European Union. For consistency, however, the terms European Community or EC.
will be used throughout this article.
9. Id. arts. 9.42, 113; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States"); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting states from laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports").
10. Treaty of Rome, supra note 8, arts. 85-86. An interesting question is whether a U.S. Constitu-
tion writer in 1994 would enshrine in the Constitution the concern for developing "national champi-
ons" reflected in article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, which excuses concerted activities that "contribute
to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or
economic progress." Id. art. 85(3).
11. Id. arts. 85-86.
12. Id. art. 92.
13. Similarly, international aviation safety standards are being written less through treaty making
or formal U.N. bodies and more through the informal cooperation of U.S. and E.C. regulators. See,
e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN, REGULATORY COOPERATION WITH COUNTERPART AGENCIES ABROAD:
THE FAA's AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION EXPERIENCE, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (May 1991). Also, international banking solvency standards are set by central bankers who
implement in their own countries the results of private meetings with foreign counterparts. See, e.g.,
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Consultative Paper on Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital and Standards, July 1988, 30 I.L.M. 980.
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ized convergence of competition policy has increased significantly over the past
few years, the degree to which such convergence should occur and the proper
forum for such convergence are largely disputed issues.
I. Merger Control
The convergence of competition policy is most obvious to the competition
policy community in the area of merger control. ' 4 While the differences in U.S.,
E.C., and Canadian merger control policies are undoubtedly of great significance
to competition policy experts, the similarities are more striking than the differ-
ences to an outsider.
The most notable example of the international convergence of merger policy
can be found in the U.S.-E.C. Agreement regarding the application of their
competition laws. 5 The U.S.-E.C. Agreement recognizes increasing interna-
tional economic interdependence16 and provides for notification and exchange of
information (including information about activities by private entities that might
violate the competition laws of the other party).17 The Agreement also provides
for coordination of enforcement and assistance to the other party's enforcement,
within the limits of the assisting party's laws and interests.'" The U.S.-E.C.
Agreement is subject to considerations of comity."' Yet it provides for an interest-
ing form of "positive comity" under which one party can request that the other
party take action against allegedly anticompetitive private activity that affects
the requesting party's interests. 20 Virtually every major merger in the western
world involves merger candidates with important operating entities in the United
States, the E.C., or both, and therefore is subject to review by the authorities
in the United States, the E.C., or both, with increasing frequency.
14. Merger control probably is the easiest form of competition policy for regulators to implement.
Mechanically, all that is needed is a prenotification requirement-hardly likely with many other types
of anticompetitive behavior. In most instances, few deep-seated complaints about merger policy will
arise as long as most domestic mergers are approved and only foreign mergers are rejected (e.g.,
Adrospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland, by the European Community, Commission Decision 619/91 of 2
October 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility with the Common Market of a Concentration, 1991 O.J.
(L 334) 42; and Thomson-LTV by the United States, see Steven Pearlstein, Thomson Withdraws from
Fight for LTV Unit, WASH. POST, July 29, 1992, at G1). Indeed, the prominence of international merger
control activity by U.S. and E.C. competition policy authorities in the 1980s and 1990s may reflect the
degree to which those authorities have been excluded from their own governments' formation of cartels and
quasi-cartels through managed trade deals in automobiles, steel, semiconductors, and similar commodities.
15. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991,
U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.-E.C. Agreement].
16. Id. preamble.
17. Id. art. III, 3.
18. Id. art. IV, 1.
19. Id. art. VI.
20. Id. art. V, 2 (e.g., the European Community may request that the United States block the
merger of two U.S. companies on the grounds that the merger would limit sales opportunities in
the United States for E.C. companies).
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Fortunately, the attitude of U.S. and E.C. authorities has been one of coopera-
tion, rather than one that ignores the potential consequences of conflicting deci-
sions on the same merger. Much international law is effective precisely because
it is in all parties' interests to make it effective. Thus, the U.S.-E.C. Agreement
can still be very effective without being a formal treaty. Admittedly, the U.S. -E.C.
Agreement does not create binding rules on the substance of competition policy
or the jurisdiction to apply such rules, but it does create a framework in which
the competition authorities of the United States and the European Community
can apply common standards and jurisdictional boundaries. 2,
II. Subsidies
The competition policy community in the United States seems to have paid
little attention to the role that government subsidies can play in distorting competi-
tion within the United States. The European Community, by contrast, has a very
active dossier of attempts to control subsidization within the Communities to
prevent such distortions. The difference between the two approaches may be
explained by the untenable assumption that there are no subsidies in the United
States, or by the unproven assumption that the level of subsidization is sufficiently
similar across the United States so as to cancel itself out.
The only recent U.S. attempt to regulate industrial subsidies was the 1984
congressional passage of state-by-state caps on the issuance of municipal industrial
development bonds.22 These caps evolved from a concern that the abuse of the
issue of municipal bonds by municipalities was shifting money out of the U.S.
Treasury, rather than from a pronouncement on competition policy.23
Subsidies have long been considered a possible distortion to international trade.
Consequently, discipline on subsidies has been the subject of intense discussion
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) throughout the entire
post-war period. 24 Not much actual progress was made on disciplining competi-
tion-distorting subsidies in the GATT in its first forty years, except for a fairly
21. Query: What deference, if any, will U.S. courts pay to the U.S. authorities' views in this
area in the context of private antitrust litigation in the United States against European companies?
22. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 915.
23. Once municipalities realized that they could issue bonds at below-market rates, because of
the tax exemption for municipal bond holders, and then relend the money at a slightly higher rate
and pocket the difference, abuses arose. A Congressional Budget Office study predicted that the
bond program would result in a net loss of $2.5 billion in revenue between 1981 and 1986. Thomas
Grubisich, D.C. Backs Cheap Loan to RCA, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1981, at BI, B4.
In 1981 the District of Columbia authorized $9.5 million in loans to expand RCA's radio and
television facilities in the city even though competitors had not received similar assistance. Id.
McDonald's also benefitted from the so-called industrial development bonds, prompting Rep. Charles
B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) to note that "[slome of these bond issues have just been blatantly unfair from
a competitive point of view." Id.
24. Discipline on other anticompetitive practices was contained in the more ambitious draft
Charter of the International Trade Organization, which was rejected by the U.S. Congress in 1950.
RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE 378 (1980).
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solid, albeit limited, prohibition of export subsidies by developed countries added
in the 1979 GATT Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.25 However, even the Subsidies
Code includes an exception negotiated in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development that permits limited export credit financing subsidies by
developed countries to developing countries.26
The GATT's limited ban on export subsidies reflected trade negotiators' primi-
tive consensus that subsidization to increase exports was a purely "beggar-thy-
neighbor" operation. The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code contains only hortatory
language about the discipline of nonexport subsidies,27 even though import substi-
tution subsidies can have the same trade effect as export subsidies.
More interesting, although less used, is a doctrine developed through GATT
dispute resolution that the granting of production subsidies by an importing coun-
try could nullify or impair the benefit that an exporting country expected to
receive from the importing country's tariff reductions. The first formal GATT
dispute resolution case illustrates the point well.28 In 1949 Australia had agreed
through GATT negotiations to lower its tariff on certain fertilizers, including
sodium nitrate.29 Chile, expecting to be a major beneficiary of that tariff reduction,
increased its exports of sodium nitrate to Australia. Australia then removed a
subsidy on imports of sodium nitrate while maintaining a subsidy on imports of
ammonium sulphates, a competing fertilizer. 30 The GATT Council adopted a
working party report stating that the Australian subsidy on ammonium sulfates
nullified or impaired the benefit Chile could reasonably expect from the tariff
cut. In effect, the working party adopted the quasi-contractual theory found in
the GATT.3
The lack of international discipline on subsidies is evident in the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, which reflects a wide gap between the concern that subsidies
would distort competition (a strongly held U.S. government view) and the view
that subsidies have beneficial economic effects (held by most other governments,
especially the European Community). To a large extent, this disagreement was
illusory. The United States is a major, albeit uncoordinated, user of subsidies,32
while the European Community, despite its defense of the use of subsidies in
25. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BISD 26S/56 (1980).
26. Id. at 81(K).
27. See id. at 69-71.
28. See The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GAT, II BISD 188 (1952).
29. Id. at 188, 1.
30. Id. at 190, 6.
31. Id. at 192, 12. A recent GATT panel applied similar reasoning to E.C. oilseed subsidies.
European Economic Community: Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, GATT, BISD 37S/86 (1991).
32. See The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 9, 1994) (testimony of Rufus Yerxa, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative).
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international trade negotiations, has successfully implemented the only adminis-
trative system for disciplining subsidies.33
In late 1989 the trade negotiators for both the United States and the European
Community began to realize that there was considerable convergence in their
real positions. This convergence was formulated in the April 15, 1994, GATT
Subsidies Code. 4 While technically the responsibility of former GATT Director
General Arthur Dunkel, this code (unlike some of the codes in other areas) is
the product of intensive and successful negotiations between the United States,
the European Community, and Canada, with exceptionally able assistance from
the GATT Secretariat and considerable input from (and acquiescence by) the
major developing countries. While the 1994 Subsidies Code is a lengthy and
complex document, the essence of the text is an effective prohibition of virtually
all nongeneral (specific) subsidies above a de minimis level that affect the produc-
tion of goods, regardless of whether those goods are exported.3 5 This prohibition
is accomplished by permitting any of the 116 GATT members to obtain a binding
ruling against any other member's proposed or actual subsidy program that does
not fit within one of the following four exemptions:
36
A. Subsidies for research and some development assistance are not actionable,
but are subject to certain limits. The assistance can only constitute 75 percent
of the cost of industrial research or 50 percent of the cost of precompetitive
development activity, and the assistance must be limited to certain specified
costs. 37 This exemption reflects a tension within the U.S. government between
trade policy ideologues, who are convinced that all subsidies are evil, and the
research and development community, which recognizes the major role that gov-
ernment plays in such activities.3"
B. Regional development programs are exemptedfrom the general prohibitions
as long as the region falls within carefully defined limits (including per capita
33. See, inter alia, Community Framework for State Aids for Research and Development, 1986
O.J. (C 83) 2; Commission Communication on the Method for the Application of Art. 92(3)(a) and
(c) to Regional Aid, 1988 O.J. (C 212) 2.
34. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN/FA 229 (Apr. 15, 1994) reprinted
in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1533
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Subsidies Code].
35. Id. 13.1.
36. Id. 11 4.7, 4.10.
37. Id. 8.2(a).
38. The research community won out over the trade policy community in 1993 when the Clinton
Administration reversed more than twenty years of U.S. policy in order to favor government assis-
tance; the 1991 draft of the Code limited the assistance to 50% of research and 25% of a much more
narrow category of precompetition activity. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MTN.TNC/W/FA, § I, 1 8.2(a) (Dec. 20, 1991).
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income in the region that is at least 15 percent lower than the national average
or unemployment that is at least 110 percent of the national average).39  The
main loophole in the regional exemption is the lack of a numerical cap on the
amount of money that can be put into enterprises in these areas. Although the
specificity requirement precludes large subsidies, language in a footnote states that
"regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount of assistance
which can be granted to each subsidized project."'
C. Subsidies for adapting existing facilities to new environmental requirements
are not countervailable if the subsidy:
(1) is a one-time nonrecurring measure;
(2) is limited to 20 percent of the cost of adaptation;
(3) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the investment;
(4) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of
pollution; and
(5) is available to all firms that can adopt the new equipment and/or production
process.4 1
The 1994 Subsidies Code recognizes the high cost of environmental protection
regulations and the value of government participation in meeting these costs.
This provision marks one of the first instances of environmental protections being
incorporated into the GATT.
D. A de minimis subsidization level of 1 percent was established,42 to some
extent reflecting E. C. practice, which permits a de minimis level of subsidization
of 50,000 ECU. 3  The inclusion of a de minimis level reflects the political
reality that politicians want to subsidize projects and that such low level subsidies
should not have much impact on trade.
There is general recognition that subsidization of research and development
activities can be legitimate in some circumstances, specifically where the research
and development would not otherwise occur (for lack of private funding), because
the private funder would not reap the benefits of the research due to the appropria-
bility of the results."4 Similarly, some arguments can be made for the rationality
of limited cases of assistance to disadvantaged regions, although such programs
and practices are more often a recognition of political reality, both to maintain
national cohesion4 5 and, at a more practical level, to improve local politicians'
reelection chances.
39. Id. 8.2(b).
40. Id. 8.2(b) n.28.
41. Id. 8.2(c).
42. Id. 11.9; see also id. 27.10, 27.11.
43. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises art. 3.2, 1992
O.J. (C 213) 2, 4.
44. ROBERT E. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 129 (1970).
45. One thinks of the severe disparities between northern and southern Italy, or within Great
Britain and Canada.
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III. Private Anticompetitive Practices
The 1948 Havana Charter creating the International Trade Organization con-
tained a comprehensive scheme for controlling private restrictive business prac-
tices.46 Chapter V of the Havana Charter established a general policy to address
restrictive business practices whereby members would agree to cooperate with
the International Trade Organization to prevent "business practices affecting
international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster
monopolistic control." 47 Such practices include, inter alia, price fixing, market
division, limiting production, and discrimination against particular enterprises.48
Chapter V provided for investigations conducted by the International Trade Orga-
nization upon a written complaint by a member or by an enterprise within a
member's jurisdiction.49 The Organization could request that remedial action be
taken by members if it found a restrictive business practice.
50
The Havana Charter was dropped at the insistence of the United States, and
the article on restrictive business practices was not included in the short list of
commercial policy issues to be included in the slimmed down GATT. While it
is questionable whether the world was ready for an international organization to
control business practices at that level in 1948, one can understand the irony
with which some countries now perceive U.S. complaints about foreign anticom-
petitive practices.
Restrictive business practices are the area of competition policy subject to the
least international coordination. There has been some convergence in practice
about standards for judging whether prices are illegally predatory, 51 and even
more convergence, in practice, about how fervently predatory pricing investiga-
tions should be pursued. The only multilateral agreement that deals with restrictive
business practices, however, does not control anticompetitive practices, but rather
imposes anticompetitive trade barriers. This agreement is the GATT Antidumping
Code.52
In the 1970s and 1980s antidumping law became the leading vehicle for exclud-
ing inconvenient import competition.53 The exclusion was possible because the
antidumping rules applied by every major user country penalized behavior by
46. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2178 (Mar.
24, 1948), reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 3206 (1948).
47. Id. art. 46, 1.
48. Id. art. 46, 3.
49. Id. art. 48, 1.
50. Id. art 48, 7.
51. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PREDATORY PRICING
(1989).
52. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GATT, BISD 26S/171 (1980).
53. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: USE OF THE GATT ANTI-
DUMPING CODE (1990) [hereinafter GATT ANTIDUMPING CODE]. U.S. exporters are the leading
targets of other countries' antidumping laws. Id. at 19.
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foreign companies that was permitted by their domestic competitors.l Worse
yet, in every country except Canada and the United States, the decision to impose
antidumping duties is purely discretionary, usually made by the trade or finance
ministry with no effective check on political decisions.5 The United States and
Canada, at least, have independent administrative agencies to determine whether
the requisite injury required by the GATT had occurred.
Frequently, antidumping cases are simply the pretext for policing or creating
cartels.56 In the United States, major antidumping cases on fertilizer, semiconduc-
tors, steel, and uranium became the means by which import prices or quantities,
or both, could be "stabilized" in those industries. 7
The GATT has proven to be incapable of preventing the anticompetitive use
of antidumping laws. The United States refuses to accept GATT panel findings
that U.S. antidumping determinations violate the GATT. In one notable instance,
the United States used a victory by Mexico against the United States in a GATT
panel with respect to a U.S. antidumping duty to try to force Mexico to accept
the imposition of a quota and a minimum price. 8 In the Uruguay Round, every
major trading entity except the United States and the European Community de-
manded a certain degree of reform in the GATT Antidumping Code to prevent
some of the more extreme abuses, but to no avail. The GATT Secretariat caved
in to high-level political pressure from the United States and the European Com-
munity and produced a code that is as tilted against foreign competition (including,
of course, U.S. companies in their export markets) as the prior code.59
54. See generally ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Jackson
& Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989) [hereinafter ANTIDUMPING]. From 1988 to 1992 the United States,
which does not have the most protectionist antidumping rules, found dumping in 97% of all cases
investigated. David Frum, Dump It, FOi s, Sept. 28, 1992, at 64. As Laura Tyson points out,
"[a]s currently written and applied, both national and multilateral (GATT) antidumping laws err in
the direction of deterring competitive behavior that is not unfair or predatory." LAURA D. TYSON,
WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 270 (1992).
55. See generally ANTIDUMPING, supra note 54.
56. Patrick A. Messerlin, The EC Antidumping Enforcement: The Procedures 13 (May 14,
1991), presented at University of Wisconsin seminar: "Are the Fair Trade and Safeguard Laws
Operating as Intended?" See also Trade Law Cartels, J. COMM., Dec. 13, 1990, at 8. ("In a St.
Paul, Minn. courtroom, a former executive for the Canadian fertilizer industry has alleged that U.S.
and Canadian producers in 1987 arranged to artificially inflate prices for potash, a mineral essential
in farming. The unusual part of the case is that this alleged price-fixing took place through [an
antidumping suspension agreement] begun by the U.S. government").
57. See Potassium Chloride from Canada Case, 53 Fed. Reg. 1393 (Dep't Comm. 1988) (suspen-
sion of investigation); Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, June 11, 1991,
U.S.-Japan, 31 I.L.M. 1074 (1992); Arrangement Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products, 1989,
U.S.-E.C.; Uranium from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan,
57 Fed. Reg. 49,220 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (suspension of investigations and amendment of preliminary
determination).
58. 12 WASH. TARIFF & TRADE LETTER, Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
59. The victory of those special interests seeking protection from import competition through
antidumping action can be measured by the change in positions by the United States. In the negotiation
of the first GATT Antidumping Code in 1966, the United States proposed a fundamental review of
whether the concept of antidumping laws made any sense economically. Antidumping Policies, Note
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However, the Clinton Administration recently has demonstrated some recogni-
tion of the anticompetitive effects of antidumping practices. The annual Economic
Report of the President notes that:
unlike domestic antitrust laws, which generally increase competition and lower prices,
national antidumping laws sometimes reduce competition and raise prices. Both in the
United States and elsewhere, antidumping laws go beyond preventing anticompetitive
practices-which should be their rationale-and often have the effect of protecting
domestic industries from foreign competition.0
The question of whether the U.S. Administration actually embraces this position
will be answered when it completes the drafting of the Uruguay Round implement-
ing legislation.
IV. The Future
Since GATT has been incapable of improving the rules of fair competition by
making antidumping rules less anticompetitive, several proposals have surfaced
to undertake an international negotiation of rules on competition policy, with the
focus on the GATT as the proper forum. Sir Leon Brittan, the Vice-President
and Commissioner for Competition of the European Communities until 1993,
has on several occasions called for an expanded role for the GATT in developing
international competition rules to "take some of the strain from a sole reliance
on trade law at the international level. , 6' Brittan has suggested that the parties
develop minimum competition rules that would be enforced by domestic authori-
ties. The failure to enforce these rules could result in a GATT investigation and
ultimately some form of retaliation. Brittan's plan could also provide for direct
access to the GATT enforcement process for private parties. Brittan urged that
negotiations on competition policy begin as soon as the Uruguay Round was
completed. In 1993, after becoming the European Community's chief trade nego-
tiator, Brittan pressed OECD nations "to intensify efforts to establish internation-
by the United States Delegation, Jan. 10, 1966, TN.64/NTB/W/3 at 1 ("[W]e welcome the initiative
taken by the United Kingdom in focussing attention on the opportunity for clarification of the principles
of antidumping in order to ensure that future antidumping measures will not improperly restrict
international trade"). But the proposal was squelched by the European Community. Note of the
Meeting of the Group on Antidumping Policies held 25/26 January 1966, at 1 (Feb. 1966).
In the Uruguay Round, when similar proposals were made by the Nordic countries, Statements
by the Nordic Countries, Oct. 2, 1987, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/12, and Hong Kong, Principles and
Purposes of Antidumping Provisions, Communications from the Delegation of Hong Kong, July 3,
1989, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46, the United States joined the European Community in quashing them,
Statement of the United States Introducing the United States'Proposal, Dec. 20, 1989, MTN.GNG/
NG8/W/Add. 1, at 5 ("[t]he United States does not find that a convincing case has been made for
revisiting the foundations of antidumping rules that have been in place for over 40 years").
60. Economic Report of the President 239 (Feb. 1994).
61. EC Commissioner Recommends Larger Role for GATT in Developing Competitive Rules, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 274 (1992).
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ally agreed minimum competition rules." 62 Brittan recognized however, that the
creation of international competition rules would be a long-term objective.63
In July 1993 the International Antitrust Code Working Group released a draft
international antitrust code, which is designed to be a GATT agreement. 54 This
antitrust code focuses on the GATT as the central body for the promulgation of
international antitrust rules, noting that the "GATT in particular is at the heart
of [the] worldwide trading system. Therefore, it is GATT where antimonopolistic
and procompetitive rules on international trade and commerce should be inte-
grated." 65 The antitrust code was developed:
to open markets, terminate export cartels, fashion a common rule on predation and
dumping, establish common rules for clearing transactions, allow authorities with a
global view to offer the impact on all citizens regardless of nationality, and to "bring
a consciousness to the process" of convergence that is already taking place. 66
However, the specific rules set forth in the antitrust code have provoked criti-
cism even from members of the International Antitrust Code Working Group,
who prefer a "less rigid concept of allowing more 'unique and different develop-
ments to bubble up from below.' 67 The experience with the draft code demon-
strates that, while the interest in the international convergence of competition
policy has grown, the degree to which these policies should converge will likely
remain an unsettled issue for some time.
V. Conclusion
Over the past twenty years, and particularly within the last decade, world
governments have taken small yet continuous steps toward the global harmoniza-
tion of competition policy rules. Although the world may not be ready for a
multilateral competition code (as it was not in 1948 when the United States
rejected the Havana Charter), governments are becoming even more aware of
the international effects of domestic competition policy decisions, as well as the
anticompetitive effects of certain trade remedies.68
62. Robert Rice, Brittan Urges Basic Competition Rules, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at 3.
63. Id.
64. International Antitrust Code Will Be Studied by GAT Members, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 259 (Aug. 19, 1993).
65. Draft International Antitrust Code, July 10, 1993, § II, reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), Special Supp. at S-3 (Aug. 19, 1993).
66. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), supra note 64, at 259.
67. Id. at 260.
68. Indeed, the push for greater coordination of competition policy decisions may come from
multinational companies rather than from governments. For example, during its recent antitrust
settlement negotiations with the Justice Department, Microsoft requested that E.C. officials participate
in the talks so that a similar investigation in the European Community could be resolved simultane-
ously. See Microsoft Deal Came Down to a Phone Call, WASH. POST, July 18, 1994, at Al, A4.
The U.S. government and the European Commission agreed to simultaneous negotiations. Id.
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Just as environmental and labor standards have worked their way into trade
talks, competition policy will likely become a major issue on the table of future
negotiations. With the GATT now under the auspices of the World Trade Organi-
zation, Sir Leon Brittan's proposal to bring competition policy under the GATT
could become a topic of the next GATT Round.
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